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Main Directions of Education*

In the history of education, we repeatedly come across certain typical views of education. Even if they are rarely realised in a pure form, it is nevertheless important to work them out, to start with, in such a pure form, as "ideal types" in the sense intended by Max Weber, to follow them through as models for education, as it were, in order, first of all, to gain a general perspective *of* the vast number of educational theories, and then to enquire as to their appropriateness, the extent to which they cancel each other out or are compatible, or to which they may or even must complement one another, in order to arrive at a proper picture of what happens or ought to happen in education.

I

The first and to some extent also most obvious view of education sees it in analogy to an act of craftsmanship. As, for instance, the potter makes an object for use, a jug or plate, say, from a given material, clay, according to a particular craft procedure which can be learned, the educator may be supposed to shape the still unmoulded child from existing material and according to certain rules that may be learned towards a particular educational objective, so that it becomes able to fulfil its function in society as an adult person. Here, education appears as the making of something makeable. It is the proud feeling of the power of education, as it is expressed in Goethe's "Prome- [243/244] theus": "Here I sit, shaping men in my image, a race that shall resemble me." A theoretical foundation for this view was supplied as early as 3 centuries ago by John Locke (1632—93): as one can easily channel the water of a river at the source in one direction or the other, thus determining its further course, the minds of children can equally easily be guided, like the water, in one direction or another. The necessary precondition for this belief in the power of education is a particular view of man. If the mind begins as a tabula rasa or empty slate, it can be shaped in particular ways by the regulation of the impressions that it receives. The case is similar, even though with considerably refined behaviouristic methods, with B. F. Skinner's theory of conditioning.

Much can indeed be understood with the aid of such a technological model. The concept of "Bildung", one of the fundamental German terms for 'education', is to be seen thus in its basic sense, as the shaping of the young person according to an image in the mind of the educator.

II

The view of education as the making of some kind of make-able object soon shows its limitations. The first of these arises from the fact that the child is not some kind of malleable material, but an organic being that develops according to laws of its own, and which must thus be treated in accordance with these laws. This leads to the second basic approach of education, that of permitting to grow that which will grow of its own accord; we may call this the organological model. This view considers the child growing up by analogy with a plant developing outwards from a central germ, and the educator correspondingly by analogy with a gardener, who has to take good care of his plants, but cannot arbitrarily accelerate their growth, but must wait for them to grow up by themselves.

It was presumably Rousseau (1718-78) who first put toward such a view with the notion of

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negative education. The educator cannot make something himself, but only prevent the wrong things from happening, endeavouring to ward off influences that disturb a healthy development. The complicated nature of the measures he must take to guide development in the right direction, however, indicates certain limitations to this approach too.

The organic view of human development was first put. with [244/245] precision by Herder, and then further developed in the German Classical and Romantic periods. Here the development of man was regarded according to the image of a plant. As the plant germinates from the seed, develops within itself buds and blossoms, and then ripens to produce fruit, the human being develops in comparable phases from the infant to the boy or girl and thence to man or woman.

The organological view of education was put in its purest form by Froebel (1782-1852), and led in particular to the development of infant education in the kindergarten.

The lasting value of this view lies in the recognition of the inherent value of each phase of life. The child must not be regarded as a mini-adult and the attempt made to make a proper adult out of it as quickly as possible. This false picture of the child is clearly visible in pictorial representations even in the 18th century, in which children are shown with the physical proportions of adults, merely smaller. In contrast to this, the organological view states that the child must be seen as such and its childish nature accepted. The child is no less human than the adult, but merely differently so. It is absolutely necessary for healthy development that people live out each age of life according to its peculiar characteristics, without looking beyond this. Thus Froebel says: "The infant, the boy, man as such should have no other aim at all than to be at each stage wholly what this stage requires him to be."

This leads, in the defensive direction, to an important conclusion, the warning against precocity as a danger rooted in the nature of education. Every educator, not to mention every mother, takes pleasure in progress made by his or her child, and attempts to accelerate this where possible. In contrast, a suitable education demands much patience, in order to grant to each development the necessary time, and not to skip any stage of development hastily.

III

Unlike the plant or the animal, however, human beings do not live in an essentially constant natural environment, but in an artificial form of nature made or adapted by man, i. e. civilisation. Human beings are distinguished from the rest of the organic world by being civilised creatures; moreover, this civilisation is in a constant state of flux owing to human activity. Just as [245/246] men produce a civilisation over the centuries, so they are determined by the civilisation they have created. Human beings are, as Landmann has formulated it, "creators and creatures of civilisation". And because man is an historical creature, that is, because his civilisation differs among different peoples and at different times, men, living in differing civilisations, are formed in differing ways.

a. Man is able to live only within a civilisation. The knowledge and skills necessary to survive within this civilisation are not, however, passed on to the younger generation by simple heredity as in the biological sphere. Instead their transmission requires a particular procedure by means of which young people growing up are enabled to move meaningfully within a civilisation. This leads to a further task for education, that is, the introduction to the surrounding civilisation or culture. This corresponds to the third basic model of educational theory, which we may term the education for civilisation.

The transmission of the cultural heritage, however, is not something uniform, but is constructed on different levels. The first knowledge and skills for life within the civilisation are provided by process of teaching, which takes place within the sphere of the manual crafts by means of a simple demonstration and imitation of the activities concerned. From this there develops, with an increasing degree of civilisation, the institutionalised training relationships, involving apprentice,

journeyman and master-craftsman. In this way technological knowledge and skill are transmitted from one generation to the next. To this are to be added the simple civilised techniques of reading, writing and arithmetic, which also have to be taught and learned. This in turn leads to the establishing of schools, and on to an organised educational system, in which a particular curriculum develops, which is to be transmitted. From this perspective, one can see education as transmission of the cultural heritage from the older generation to the younger.

b. The more the civilisation advances, however, the less such a simple transmission of cultural knowledge suffices, particularly in the more strongly developing mental spheres. It cannot, as Spranger (1882—1963) once drastically expressed it, be poured into the mind of the child as into an empty vessel, nor handed over to him like a parcel. Thus Spranger says: [246/247] "It is an error, and the curse of superficial educational theory, to know nothing more than this passing on, this pouring in, this authoritarian forming of the consciousness." Instead, young people must be rendered able to see the various fields of cultural knowledge from their own perspective, as it were to construct them anew in their own minds. To take Pythagoras's theorem as an example, it is not enough to learn it word for word by heart and be able to recite it; one must have understood it, and grasped why it is thus and cannot be different.

At this point, the whole consideration of education is shifted: it is no longer the aim to transmit certain material, but to develop in the child the powers that enable it to see phenomena of civilisation in its own way and to give them a living shape, so as to share in the life of the cultural community receptively but also creatively. We may describe the shaping of the mind by the living adoption of civilisation and culture as "Bildung" in the more profound sense of the word, understanding it both in its literal sense as a process of formation and also in that of the form of the mind which is achieved in this way.

This view of education is based on the precondition of a mirror-image relationship between education and civilisation. The organisation of the powers of the human mind and soul corresponds to that of the various spheres of civilisation and culture. It is above all Spranger who developed this notion in detail, in his "forms of life"""". The six main spheres which he distinguishes, the economy, the sciences, art, the loving community, politics, and religion correspond precisely to six main directions of interest in man, which are developed during the reception of the spheres of civilisation and culture concerned. Even though all of these directions are fundamentally present in every person, one is predominant, and the others group themselves round it in individual ways. Thus Spranger distinguishes the economic man from the theoretical, the aesthetic, the loving, the power-oriented, and the religious.

However, the relationships between civilisation and education can also be considered from the other perspective, that of objective civilisation or culture. For objective civilisation is not a definite quantity passed on as a kind of secure property from one generation to the next and continually increased by new achievements. It becomes something rigid, a power that restricts [247/248] life, if it is not continually appropriated anew in the minds of young people and filled with new life. Thus the renewal and bringing to life of civilisation occurs within education, and civilisation lives only in continual renewal through education. This is where reposes the great responsibility of education, not only for the development of individuals, but at the same time for the life of the civilisation as a whole.

c. The idea of education ("Bildung") as the shaping of people through the reception of cultural tradition was fully developed in the German Classical period, playing a central role in the German secondary school system from Herder (1744-1803) and Goethe (1749-1832) to W. von Humboldt (1767-1835) and Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and their contemporaries in the 19th century, and through into the 20th.

In his book on Humboldt, Spranger gave a pithy formulation of the classical notion of education with the concepts of individuality, universality and totality. At birth, a person acquires a particular unique disposition. This individuality is to be regarded as of high value; for, according

to this view, humanity can develop fully only inasmuch as it displays all the potential inherent in it in the multiplicity of individualities. But individuality also means a limitation, being one possibility beside many others, and being always one-sided. To overcome this one-sided-ness, it is necessary to extend the boundaries of individuality by its absorption of the abundance which is embodied in the objective civilisation surrounding it, by its universal, that is, omnilateral, development. This, however, creates the problems involved in losing oneself in formlessness within the multiplicity of possibilities. And this in turn creates the requirement to make it, proceeding from the given individuality, into such a whole that, if the abbreviated formulation be permitted, an individually shaped completeness of human possibilities is created, which we may, with Spranger, designate as totality. Thus the ideal is the universally developed and harmoniously shaped personality.

The task of instruction then becomes to provide a comprehensive picture not only of the native culture but also of foreign ones with their totally different kinds of potential, in order thus to teach understanding and to render fertile anything ever created by the human spirit. This was still relatively simple as long as the perspective was limited to the European world and its history, but became more difficult when, with the increasing [248/249] historical consciousness of the 19th century, beyond the Greeks and Romans, new figures out of the depths of time constantly appeared in the form of the ancient advanced civilisations of the Near East, and at the same time, in the *still* present advanced civilisations of the southern and eastern Asia, new and very different forms of interpretation of the world and modes of life became known. These were revelations of unsuspected new riches, with the intoxicating feeling of becoming acquainted with and absorbing all this.

IV

Now for a new aspect, with which we approach the fourth basic form of education. It can happen that a particular manifestation of the spiritual world suddenly presents itself to a person as an immediate and powerful challenge, jolting him out of his previous accustomed way of living. This is how the poet Rilke (1875-1926) felt when confronted with the "archaic torso of Apollo": "There is *no* part that does not see you. You must change your life." The faultless perfection of the work of art makes a person conscious of the nullity of his everyday life. He senses in it a call for a radical change in his life. And the important thing is that the challenging voice does not tell him what to do; it remains indefinite as to content, telling him only that he must change, but not how.

For this decisive experience, the notion of "Begegnung" (encounter) evolved in Germany, particularly in the years following the Second World War, in connection with the feeling of shock expressed in Existentialism. One speaks of an encounter with another person, with a figure from literature or history, or again, as in this example of a work of the plastic arts, also with particular emphasis of an encounter with God, whereas earlier one would have spoken more indefinitely of a religious experience. The notion of encounter is taken everywhere in a stressed sense, that we may term existential. It does not refer to any acquaintanceship, but only to an experience which shakes a person to the core. Encounter in this sense, to repeat it once more, is always an existential experience.

Behind it is a particular dualistic view of man, such as made its breakthrough in existentialist philosophy in the 1920s, in contrast to the humanist picture of man and the classical educational ideal based thereon. The philosopher Heidegger (1889- [249/250] 1976) formulated this contrast as a distinction between the "Eigentlichkeit" (reality) and the "Uneigentlichkeit" (spuriousness) of human existence, of man as he ought to be and mostly is not; the former term is designated with the concept of "existence" in the particular sense of Existentialist philosophy. Fundamentally, it is the ancient Christian view with the distinction between being "out of the world"

and "inside truth", according to Christian doctrine. At the same time, this new view of human life demands a new view of education. For such an encounter, affecting the innermost core of a person, cannot be "made", i. e. produced at will. On the other hand, as long as one feels responsible, as an educator, for the life of the child concerned, one cannot wait until the encounter occurs of its own accord, or fails to happen. All the educator can do is to prompt, to give a summons. With his concept of "appellative education" (appellierende Pädagogik), Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) introduced a new, hitherto neglected aspect into educational theory. Education cannot "do" anything in the existential sphere, but by means of its summons or call it can awaken the hidden inner life. The frequently misunderstood necessity of an admonition perpetually to be repeated thus acquires a more profound anthropological justification.

With the notion of awakening, which appears here, the fourth and most profound view of education, the fourth basic model of the process of education, has been reached. Here, as with the encounter, the concept of awakening must be taken in a strict sense. One can also speak, in the field of cultural education, of the awakening of powers of the mind in the child, for instance technical or artistic ability, just as one can say in poetic language that the new spring awakens the sleeping blossoms. That, however, is only a vague metaphorical mode of expression. If one takes the concept in a strict sense, a person when asleep is in a state where he is not conscious, that is, is not present in a full sense, and is not able to dispose freely of himself. The awakening caused by being woken is a sudden process without gradual transition by which he is brought to himself again. If we use the concept of awakening in a transferred sense, it can also only mean such a sudden process as the waking of a hitherto hidden, "sleeping" nucleus in the person. In this sense awakening is an originally religious notion, and this religious undertone is always audible when awakening is applied to education in an extended sense. [250/251]

If the concept of awakening is taken in its strict sense, it does not refer *to* individual powers and skills. (It would therefore, for instance, be out of place applied to physical education.) It refers only to the core of a person, the subject-point, which can relate to everything that makes up the content of life, to all acts and omissions, but itself remains indeterminate.

Awakening is at bottom always awakening of the conscience, and it is in education for conscience that education attains its zenith.

Here the question arises: what is the conscience, and how can education of the conscience be possible? Firstly, the conscience has received little attention in modern educational theory. Finding it awkward, people have attempted to explain it away with psychological theories and thus dispose of it. The conscience was seen as nothing but the "internalisation" of requirements made by society. According to this, the conscience does not originate in the soul itself; a person adopts the requirements made of him by society so thoroughly as to feel them to be his own. This view, however, as Spranger stressed, is refuted by the mere fact that the conscience can also resist the requirements made by society. In his conscience, a person feels a demand which, by its absolute nature, is distinct from all other requirements made of him, and to which he must justify himself in his life. The voice of conscience is a metaphysical experience, and to be able to hear it is the guarantee of the metaphysical nature of human life.

The demands of conscience are in general in harmony with the morality obtaining in the society concerned. This is the case as long as a person finds himself in typically patterned situations. The difficulties arise when a person finds himself in situations for which the predominant morality provides no solutions. Here his conscience places upon him the responsibility for making decisions for which there are no precedents. Then a person is all on his own, and it can happen that he has to reject the demands made on him by society and in particular the state, perceiving them to be wrong. His conscience challenges him to resist, with the result that he exposes himself to the repressions of his environment. In this way that which emerges from the call of conscience may be distinguished from arbitrary offences against prevailing norms.

This, then, provides the answer to the second question, as to how the education of the

conscience, or rather education for [251/252] conscience, is possible. The conscience cannot be "made" in the sense of the view of education as craftsmanship. Nor can it be transmitted to a young person by teaching. It can only be awakened by appealing to the conscience of a person. There results from this, as well as the limit, mentioned above, of the view of education as craftsmanship, which is determined by the laws of organic growth, the second and more profoundly incisive limit, which rests on the freedom of a young person. Whether he follows the appeal to his conscience or not is a matter for his own free choice, and that cannot be forced on him by education of any kind.

This leads, on the other hand, to the duty of restraint on the part of the educator. He can appeal to the conscience, but he must not anticipate the decision. He must really release his pupil to the freedom in which he alone can realise his innermost self.

Let me sum up: there are, then, four basic views of education to be distinguished:

1. the technological view: education as producing or making, by analogy to the work of a craftsman.
2. the organological view: education as allowing to grow, as cultivation and the prevention of disturbances.
3. the view of education for civilisation or culture, subdivided into two stages:
    a. education as the mere transmission of a cultural tradition,
    b. education as development of the necessary mental abilities.
4. the view of education as awakening, with the distinction, once again, between it
    a. as existential encounter and
    b. as education to the demands of conscience.

Each of these views can be consistently developed as a self-contained system. Each is right in stressing a particular aspect of education. But each is one-sided, because it neglects other aspects or excludes them completely.

Only when taken together do they cover the whole of education, in which each of these views has its own particular function, and each presupposes the others.

To establish how these different forms interact, depend on each other and build upon each other is the task of a comprehensive educational theory, seen as a philosophy of education.